World banks: Weapons of wealth destruction

A very interesting article by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) I thought was worth sharing:

The US$2bn loss saddled on UBS by a suspected "rogue trader" is a reminder of investment banks' awesome capacity to both create and, more recently, destroy wealth. As their lobbying against reform loses sway, banks must either accept higher costs commensurate with the risks they generate or shun racy wholesale franchises and focus on the stodgier, but safer, functions of the industry.

Three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the risks inherent in high finance appear undiminished. An apparent "rogue trader" at UBS, alleged to be 31-year-old Kweku Adoboli, will saddle the Swiss bank with a US$2bn loss, according to a company statement on September 15th (the three-year anniversary of Lehman's bankruptcy). Although the loss will not threaten the bank's solvency, it is enough to wipe out its third-quarter profits. More importantly, it is an untimely setback for the banking industry as a whole; the sector's largest players are fighting against reforms on several fronts. Their lobbying influence is likely to wane as official attitudes harden on taxpayer support for banking groups that feature both risky wholesale units and less hazardous retail businesses.

Mr Adoboli's backstory is depressingly familiar. In fact, his CV reads remarkably like that of Jerome Kerviel, the rogue trader who, at 31, cost French bank Société Générale the equivalent of US$7bn in unauthorised trades in 2008. Both Mr Kerviel and Mr Adoboli began their careers in the back office before moving into trading for the "Delta One" desks at their respective banks. Delta One units trade a wide range of securities in order to replicate the performance of benchmark assets in exchange-traded funds (ETFs) or swaps (using derivatives to track the performance of copper instead of buying the commodity itself, for example).

This flexibility could make these particular units more prone to disaster, and traders with intimate knowledge of back-office compliance procedures may be more inclined to skirt the rules on building up dangerously risky positions. UBS's unauthorised trades, for example, appeared to conform with "the normal business flows of a large global equity trading house as part of a properly hedged portfolio", the bank said in a statement on September 18th (which also boosted the estimated loss on the trades to US$2.3bn). A series of "fictitious, forward-settling, cash ETF positions" masked the positions by making them appear hedged, the bank added.

For UBS, the Kerviel-esque trading scandal is particularly damaging in light of the contrition shown by the bank following the loss of some US$50bn during the financial crisis and a subsequent bail-out by the Swiss government (see chart). The pledges to boost internal controls and tighten risk-management procedures now ring hollow. Strict new capital requirements introduced by the Swiss last year could be strengthened further, and UBS's underperforming investment bank will come under even closer scrutiny by regulators; assets at the investment banking unit are almost twice Switzerland's GDP.

Sound and fury

More broadly, the UBS affair is a fillip for supporters of sweeping regulatory reforms, and not only in Switzerland. The Basel III international capital accords, the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the recommendations of the Vickers commission in the UK all represent major overhauls of banking regulation and oversight, and all are the subject of furious lobbying by banks.

The banks' arguments, in essence, are that the new rules will throttle lending, depress returns and, ultimately, harm economic growth. But the uncomfortable regularity with which investment banks are prone to costly stumbles make the claims of banks with large wholesale arms lose much of their authority.

Goldman Sachs settled a case with the US securities regulator last year, for US$550m, in which the bank was accused of fraud related to the creation of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Fabrice Tourre, a 31-year-old middle manager at Goldman Sachs, played a prominent role in the suit, and is still fighting civil charges brought by the regulator. Like Mr Kerviel before him and Mr Adoboli after him, the prominence of Mr Tourre fits an established pattern. But the investment banking industry's problems run deeper than rogue thirty-somethings.

In the summer of 2007, when the first signs of a credit crunch emerged, many investment banks blamed bad luck for poor performance. David Viniar, chief financial officer of Goldman Sachs, famously cited "seeing things that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row". In a withering paper examining this assertion, a group of professors led by Kevin Dowd of the Nottingham University Business School revealed that a six-sigma event suggests an occurrence of "less than one day in the entire period since our species, Homo Sapiens, evolved from earlier primates". A 25-sigma event, therefore, features a vanishingly small probability best measured on "cosmological scales", they concluded.

Fighting back

Is the welter of new regulations now looming over investment banks yet another bout of bad luck? In isolation, the new rules introduced by Basel III, Dodd-Frank and other reform efforts will depress the average return on equity at large investment banks from 20% in 2010 to only 7% after implementation, according to McKinsey, a consultancy. At the group level, big banking groups will need to cut costs by 6% and at least double profits every year for five years to earn their cost of capital, it says.

Understandably, banks are lobbying against key aspects of regulatory reforms, even as they acknowledge that the pre-crisis status quo is untenable. The Institute of International Finance, a banking industry association, published a report earlier this month that claimed financial reforms would subtract 0.7% from GDP every year through 2015, resulting in 7.5m fewer jobs over that period than should otherwise be expected. "It is important to guard against allowing excessive risk aversion to act as a brake on prudent credit expansion", the institute said. Similar objections are raised in relation to the ban on proprietary trading the so-called "Volcker Rule", currently being finalised as part of Dodd-Frank's implementation in the US as well as the proposal for erecting a ring-fence around the retail units of universal banks in the UK. Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, took a different tack with recent criticism, calling the Basel III rules "blatantly anti-American" in an interview with the Financial Times.

Whatever the merits of these objections, and even if recent losses are down purely to lousy luck or relentless rogues, - a big if - the industry's frequent missteps will spur officials to err on the side of stricter rules. Witness the recent momentum for a financial transactions tax in the European Union, a measure with questionable merits as a tool to prevent future financial crises but a clear impact on the profitability of banks' capital-markets activities. A similarly stern approach should be expected when it comes to rules that have been passed but remain subject to interpretation ahead of future implementation, namely Basel III and Dodd-Frank.

Separation anxiety

In unveiling the proposals for a ring-fencing of retail banking in the UK, Sir John Vickers stressed that, "the 'too big to fail' problem must not be recast as a 'too delicate to reform' problem." By most accounts, third-quarter results from the developed world's leading banks will be disappointing. A spate of banking layoff announcements in recent weeks underscores the industry's fragility. But whereas previous bouts of banking weakness generated sympathy - and in some cases, action - among officials, similar support will be less forthcoming in the future.

Thanks to new regulations, funding costs for investment banks are likely to settle at a permanently higher plateau than before the financial crisis, reflecting the risks inherent in these businesses as well as the removal of implicit taxpayer support for so-called "casino" banking operations. Returns will fall accordingly. Banks still have significant scope to cut compensation costs in order to bolster their earnings, rather than curtail lending or hike interest rates; business loans, after all, account for only around 10-15% of banking assets in the US and Europe.

The competence of investment banks is also back in the spotlight following UBS's revelations. Recent innovations in the ETF industry - once the domain of passive, low-cost index trackers - recall the dangerous complexity that blossomed in mortgage-backed securities before the financial crisis. Investigations into the risks of synthetic ETFs that are the lifeblood of Delta One desks were already underway in several jurisdictions before UBS's announcement. An industry that argues for flexibility in new regulations, and yet is gaining form when it comes to both creating and mismanaging complexity, will find that its appeals carry less authority than in the past.